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Abstract. Fusing the scores of several biometric systems is a very promising ap-
proach to improve the overall system’s accuracy. Despite many works in the lit-
erature, it is surprising that there is no coordinated effort in making a benchmark
database available. It should be noted that fusion in this context consists not only of
multimodal fusion, but also intramodal fusion, i.e., fusing systems using the same
biometric modality but different features, or same features but using different classi-
fiers. Building baseline systems from scratch often prevents researchers from putting
more efforts in understanding the fusion problem. This paper describes a database
of scores taken from experiments carried out on the XM2VTS face and speaker
verification database. It then proposes several fusion protocols and provides some
state-of-the-art tools to evaluate the fusion performance.
1 Motivation
Biometric authentication (BA) is a process of verifying an identity claim using a person’s behavioral
and physiological characteristics. BA is becoming an important alternative to traditional authentica-
tion methods such as keys (“something one has”, i.e., by possession) or PIN numbers (“something
one knows”, i.e., by knowledge) because it is essentially “who one is”, i.e., by biometric information.
Therefore, it is not susceptible to misplacement or forgetfulness. Examples of biometric modalities
are fingerprint, face, voice, hand-geometry and retina scans [1]. However, today, biometric-based se-
curity systems (devices, algorithms, architectures) still have room for improvement, particularly in
their accuracy, tolerance to various noisy environments and scalability as the number of individuals
increases. Biometric data is often noisy because of deformable nature of biometric traits, corruption
by environmental noise, variability over time and occlusion by the user’s accessories. The higher the
noise, the less reliable the biometric system becomes.
One very promising approach to improve the overall system’s accuracy is to fuse the scores of
several biometric systems [2]. Despite many works in the literature, e.g. [3, 4], it is surprising that
there is no coordinated effort in making a benchmark database available for such task. This work is
one step towards better sharing of scores to focus on better understanding of the fusion mechanism.
In the literature, there are several approaches towards studying fusion. One practice is to use vir-
tual identities whereby a biometric modality from one person is paired with the biometric modality
of another person. From the experiment point of view, these biometric modalities belong to the same
person. While this practice is somewhat accepted in the literature, it was questioned whether this
was a right thing to do or not during the 2003 Workshop on Multimodal User Authentication [5].
The fundamental issue here is the independence assumption that two or more biometric traits of a
single person are independent from each other1. Another practice is more reasonable: use off-the-
1 To the best of our knowledge, there is no work in the literature that approves or disapproves such
assumption.
shelf biometric systems [6] and quickly acquire scores. While this is definitely a better solution,
committing to acquire the systems and to collect the data is admittedly a very time-consuming pro-
cess. None of the mentioned approaches prevails over the others in understanding the problem of
fusion. There are currently on-going but independent projects in the biometric community to acquire
multimodal biometric databases, e.g., the BANCA [7], XM2VTS [8], BIOMET [9], MYCT [10] and
University of Notre Dame Biometrics multimodal databases2 . BANCA and XM2VTS contain face
and speech modalities; BIOMET contains face, speech, fingerprint, hand and signature modalities;
MYCT contains ten-print fingerprint and signature modalities and University of Notre Dame Bio-
metrics Database contains face, ear profile and hand modalities acquired using visible, Infrared-Red
and range sensors at different angles. Taking multimodal biometrics in a wider context, i.e., in the
sense that it involves different sensors, the FRGC3 database can also be considered as “multimodal”.
It contains face modality captured using camera (at different angles) and range sensors in different
(controlled or uncontrolled) settings.
As a matter of fact, most reported works in the literature about fusion often concentrates on
treatment of the baseline systems. While baseline systems are definitely important, the subject of
fusion is unfortunately downplayed. Hence, we propose here not only to publish scores resulted
from biometric authentication experiments, but also to provide a clear documentation of the baseline
systems and well-defined fusion protocols so that experimental results can be compared. To the
best of our knowledge, this is first ever published score data set. It is intended for comparison of
different fusion classifiers on a common setting. We further provide a set of evaluation tools such as
the DET [11] curve and the recent Expected Performance Curve (EPC) [12], visualisation of False
Acceptance and False Rejection Rates versus threshold, distribution of client and impostor scores,
and the HTER significance test [13], among others.
The scores are taken from the publicly available XM2VTS face and speech database4. It should
be mentioned here that there exists another software tool that analyses biometric error rate called
PRESS[14]. However, it does not include the DET curve. The tools proposed here, together with the
database, provide a new plot called Expected Performance Curve (EPC) [12] and a significance test
specially designed to test the Half Total Error Rate (HTER) [13].
Section 2 explains the XM2VTS database, the Lausanne Protocols and the proposed Fusion
Protocols. Section 3 documents the 8 baseline systems that can be used for fusion. Section 4 presents
the evaluation criteria, i.e., how experiments should be reported and compared. This is followed by
conclusions in Section 5.
2 Database and Protocols
2.1 The XM2VTS database and the Lausanne Protocols
The XM2VTS database [15] contains synchronised video and speech data from 295 subjects, recorded
during four sessions taken at one month intervals. On each session, two recordings were made, each
consisting of a speech shot and a head shot. The speech shot consisted of frontal face and speech
recordings of each subject during the recital of a sentence. The database is divided into three sets:
a training set, an evaluation set and a test set. The training set (LP Train) was used to build client
models, while the evaluation set (LP Eval) was used to compute the decision thresholds (as well as
other hyper-parameters) used by classifiers. Finally, the test set (LP Test) was used to estimate the
performance.
2 Accessible from http://www.nd.edu/∼cvrl/UNDBiometricsDatabase.html
3 Accessible from http://www.frvt.org/FRGC/
4 The database of scores as well as the tools mentioned are freely available for download at
http://www.idiap.ch/∼norman/fusion
The 295 subjects were divided into a set of 200 clients, 25 evaluation impostors and 70 test
impostors. There exists two configurations or two different partitioning approaches of the training
and evaluation sets. They are called Lausanne Protocol I and II, denoted as LP1 and LP2 in this
paper. In both configurations, the test set remains the same. Their difference is that there are three
training shots per client for LP1 and four training shots per client for LP2. Table 1 is the summary of
the data. The last column of Table 1 is explained in Section 2.2. Note that LP Eval’s of LP1 and LP2
are used to calculate the optimal thresholds that will be used in LP Test. Results are reported only
for the test sets, in order to be as unbiased as possible (using an a priori selected threshold). More
details can be found in [8].
2.2 The Fusion Protocols
The fusion protocols are built upon the Lausanne Protocols. Before the discussion, it is important
to distinguish two categories of approaches: client-independent and client-dependent fusion ap-
proaches. The former approach has only a global fusion function that is common to all identities
in the database. The latter approach has a different fusion function for a different identity. It has
been reported that client-dependent fusion is better than client-independent fusion, given that there
are “enough” client-dependent score data. Examples of client-dependent fusion approach are client-
dependent threshold [16], client-dependent score normalisation [17] or different weighing of expert
opinions using linear [18] or non-linear combination [19]. The fusion protocols that are described
here can be client-dependent or client-independent.
It should be noted that one can fuse any of the 8 baseline experiments in LP1 and 5 baseline
experiments in LP2 (to be detailed in Section 3). We propose a full combination of all these systems.
This protocol is called FP-full. Hence, there are altogether 28 − 8 − 1 = 248 possible combina-
tions for LP1 and 25 − 5 − 1 = 26 for LP2. The reasons for minus one and minus the number of
experts are that using zero expert and using a single expert are not valid options. However, some
constraints are useful. For instance, in some situations, one is constrained to using a single biometric
modality. In this case, we propose an intramodal fusion (FP-intramodal) . When no constraint is
imposed, we propose a full combination (FP-multimodal). FP-intramodal contains 25−5−1 = 26
face-expert fusion experiments for LP1, 23 − 3 − 1 = 4 speech-expert fusion experiments for
LP1, 1 face-expert fusion experiment for LP2 and 23 − 3 − 1 = 4 speech expert-fusion experi-
ments for LP2. Hence, FP-intramodal contains 35 fusion experiments. The second protocol containsP
5
m=1
P
3
n=1
(5Cm
3Cn) = 217 combinations, where nCk is “n choose k”. As can be seen, the
first three fusion protocols contain an exponential number of combinations. For some specific study,
Table 1. The Lausanne Protocols of XM2VTS database. The last column shows the terms used in the
fusion protocols presented in Section 2.2. LP Eval corresponds to the Fusion protocols’ development
set while LP Test corresponds to the Fusion Protocols’ evaluation set.
Data sets Lausanne Protocols Fusion
LP1 LP2 Protocols
LP Train client accesses 3 4 NIL
LP Eval client accesses 600 (3× 200) 400 (2× 200) Fusion dev
LP Eval impostor accesses 40,000 (25× 8 × 200) Fusion dev
LP Test client accesses 400 (2 × 200) Fusion eva
LP Test impostor accesses 112,000† (70× 8 × 200) Fusion eva
†: Due to one corrupted speech file of one of the 70 impostors in this set, this file was deleted,
resulting in 200 less of impostor scores, or a total of 111,800 impostor scores.
it is also useful to introduce a smaller set of combinations, each time using only two baseline experts,
according to the nature of the base-expert. This protocol is called FP-2. Three categories of fusion
types have been identified under FP-2, namely multimodal fusion (using different biometric traits),
intramodal fusion with different feature sets and intramodal fusion with the same feature set but
different classifiers. There are altogether 32 such combinations (not listed here; see [20] for details).
Note that there are 8 biometric samples in the XM2VTS database on a per client basis. They are
used in the following decomposition: 3 samples are used to train the baseline experts in LP1 (and 4
in LP2) on LP Train. There are remaining 3 samples in the in LP1 Eval (and only 2 in LP2 Eval).
Finally, for both protocols, 2 client accesses for testing in the test set. Because fusion classifiers
cannot be trained using scores from the training set, or they are simply not available in the current
settings, we are effectively using the LP Eval to train the fusion classifiers and then LP Test to test
the fusion classifiers’ performance on the LP Test. To avoid confusion in terminology used, we call
LP Eval as the fusion development set and LP Test as the fusion evaluation set.
3 Baseline System Description
There are altogether 8 baseline systems5 All the 8 baseline systems were used in LP1. On the other
hand, 5 out of 8 were used in LP2. This results in 13 baseline experiments (for LP1 and LP2). The
following explanation describes these systems in terms of their features, classifiers, and the complete
system which is made up of the pair (feature type, classifier).
3.1 Face and Speech Features
The face baseline experts are based on the following features:
1. FH: normalised face image concatenated with its RGB Histogram (thus the abbreviation FH) [21].
2. DCTs: DCTmod2 features [22] extracted from face images with a size of 40 × 32 (rows ×
columns) pixels. The Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) coefficients are calculated from an
8 × 8 window with horizontal and vertical overlaps of 50%, i.e., 4 pixels in each direction.
Neighbouring windows are used to calculate the “delta” features. The result is a set of 35 feature
vectors, each having a dimensionality of 18. (s indicates the use of this small image compared
to the bigger size image with the abbreviation b.)
3. DCTb: Similar to DCTs except that the input face image has 80× 64 pixels. The result is a set
of 221 feature vectors, each having a dimensionality of 18.
The speech baseline experts are based on the following features:
1. LFCC: The Linear Filter-bank Cepstral Coefficient (LFCC) [23] speech features were com-
puted with 24 linearly-spaced filters on each frame of Fourier coefficients sampled with a win-
dow length of 20 milliseconds and each window moved at a rate of 10 milliseconds. 16 DCT
coefficients are computed to decorrelate the 24 coefficients (log of power spectrum) obtained
from the linear filter-bank. The first temporal derivatives are added to the feature set.
2. PAC: The Phase Auto-Correlation Mel Filter-bank Cepstral Coefficient (PAC-MFCC) features [24]
are derived with a window length of 20 milliseconds and each window moves at a rate of 10
milliseconds. 20 DCT coefficients are computed to decorrelate the 30 coefficients obtained from
the Mel-scale filter-bank. The first temporal derivatives are added to the feature set.
5 Public contribution of score files is welcome. More will be released in the future as they become
available.
3. SSC: Spectral Subband Centroid (SSC) features, originally proposed for speech recognition [25],
were used for speaker authentication in [26]. It was found that mean-subtraction could improve
these features significantly. The mean-subtracted SSCs are obtained from 16 coefficients. The
γ parameter, which is a parameter that raises the power spectrum and controls how much influ-
ence the centroid, is set to 0.7 [27]. Also, the first temporal derivatives are added to the feature
set.
3.2 Classifiers
Two different types of classifiers were used for these experiments: Multi-Layer Perceptrons (MLPs)
and a Bayes Classifier using Gaussian Mixture Models (GMMs) [28]. While in theory both classifiers
could be trained using any of the previously defined feature sets, in practice MLPs are better at
matching feature vectors of fixed-size while GMMs are better at matching sequences (feature vectors
of unequal size). Whatever the classifier is, the hyper-parameters (e.g. the number of hidden units for
MLPs or the number of Gaussian components for GMMs) are tuned on the evaluation set LP1 Eval.
The same set of hyper-parameters are used in both LP1 and LP2 configurations of the XM2VTS
database.
For each client-specific MLP, the feature vectors associated to the client are treated as positive
patterns while all other feature vectors not associated to the client are treated as negative patterns. All
MLPs reported here were trained using the stochastic version of the error-back-propagation training
algorithm [28].
For the GMMs, two competing models are often needed: a world and a client-dependent model.
Initially, a world model is first trained from an external database (or a sufficiently large data set) using
the standard Expectation-Maximisation algorithm [28]. The world model is then adapted for each
client to the corresponding client data using the Maximum-A-Posteriori adaptation [29] algorithm.
3.3 Baseline Systems
The baseline experiments based on DCTmod2 feature extraction were reported in [30] while those
based on normalised face images and RGB histograms (FH features) were reported in [21]. Details
of the experiments, coded in the pair (feature, classifier), for the face experts, are as follows:
1. (FH, MLP) Features are normalised Face concatenated with Histogram features. The client-
dependent classifier used is an MLP with 20 hidden units. The MLP is trained with geometri-
cally transformed images [21].
2. (DCTs, GMM) The face features are the DCTmod2 features calculated from an input face
image of 40 × 32 pixels, hence, resulting in a sequence of 35 feature vectors each having 18
dimensions. There are 64 Gaussian components in the GMM. The world model is trained using
all the clients in the training set [30].
3. (DCTb, GMM) Similar to (DCTs,GMM), except that the features used are DCTmod2 features
calculated from an input face image of 80 × 64 pixels. This produces in a sequence of 221
feature vectors each having 18 dimensions. The corresponding GMM has 512 Gaussian com-
ponents [30].
4. (DCTs, MLP) Features are the same as those in (DCTs,GMM) except that an MLP is used in
place of a GMM. The MLP has 32 hidden units [30]. Note that in this case a training example
consists of a big single feature vector with a dimensionality of 35× 18. This is done by simply
concatenating 35 feature vectors each having 18 dimensions6 .
6 This may explain why MLP, an inherently discriminative classifier, has worse performance com-
pared to GMM, a generative classifier. With high dimensionality yet having only a few training
5. (DCTb, MLP) The features are the same as those in (DCTb,GMM) except that an MLP with
128 hidden units is used. Note that in this case the MLP in trained on a single feature vector
with a dimensionality of 221 × 18 [30].
and for the speech experts:
1. (LFCC, GMM) This is the Linear Filter-bank Cepstral Coefficients (LFCC) obtained from
the speech data of the XM2VTS database. The GMM has 200 Gaussian components, with the
minimum relative variance of each Gaussian fixed to 0.5, and the MAP adaptation weight equals
0.1. This is the best known model currently available [31] under clean conditions.
2. (PAC, GMM) The same GMM configuration as in LFCC is used. Note that in general, 200-
300 Gaussian components would give about 1% of difference of HTER [31]. This system is
particularly robust to very noisy conditions (less than 6 dBs, as tested on the NIST2001 one-
speaker detection task).
3. (SSC, GMM) The same GMM configuration as in LFCC is used [27]. This system is known
to provide an optimal performance under moderately noisy conditions (18-12 dBs, as tested on
NIST2001 one-speaker detection task).
3.4 Preliminary Correlation Analysis
A preliminary analysis was carried out on the FP-2 protocol. There are 32 fusion data sets here and
each data set contains scores of two experts. Each data set contains two classes: client or impostor
scores. For each class of each data set, we computed the correlation between scores of two experts
in the linear space. The GMM and SVM scores are used as they are. Since correlation measures the
linear relationship among variables, it fails to measure the MLP scores which are trained using a tanh
or a sigmoid nonlinear activation function. An inverse of tanh or sigmoid function is applied to the
scores prior to computing the correlation values. With the absence of this corrective procedure, the
strong correlation is systematically under-estimated for the intramodal fusion datasets. The resultant
distribution of these correlation values, categorised into intramodal and multimodal fusion datasets,
are shown in Fig. 1. As can be observed, the multimodal fusion datasets have correlation around
zero whereas the intramodal fusion datasets have relatively high correlation values. This is a strong
indication that the gain from fusion using the intramodal data sets will be less than that from using
the multimodal data sets.
4 Performance Evaluation
There are three important concepts about evaluation of a biometric system: (1) types of errors in
biometric authentication, namely false acceptance, false rejection and their combined error called
Weighted Error Rate (WER), (2) threshold criterion and (3) evaluation criterion. A threshold crite-
rion refers to a strategy to choose a threshold to be applied on an evaluation (test) set. It is necessarily
tuned on a development (training) set. An evaluation criterion is used to measure the final generali-
sation performance and is necessarily calculated on an evaluation set. A fully operational biometric
system makes a decision using the following decision function:
F (x) =

accept if y(x) > ∆
reject otherwise, (1)
examples, the MLP cannot be trained optimally. This may affect its generalisation on unseen ex-
amples. By treating the features as a sequence, GMM was able to generalise better and hence is
more adapted to this feature set.
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Fig. 1. Smoothed distribution (measured as unnormalised likelihood using Parzen window tech-
nique) of class-dependent correlations on the 32 fusion data sets of the FP-2 protocol according
to the two categories of fusion: multimodal or intramodal. Since each data set has two classes (client
and impostor), there are altogether 2× 32 = 64 correlation values.
where y(x) is the output of the underlying expert supporting the hypothesis that the biometric sample
received x belongs to a client. The variables that follow will be derived from y(x). For simplicity,
we write y instead of y(x). The same convention applies to variables that follow. Because of the
accept-reject outcomes, the system may make two types of errors, i.e., false acceptance (FA) and
false rejection (FR). Normalised versions of FA and FR are often used and called false acceptance
rate (FAR) and false rejection rate (FRR), respectively. They are defined as:
FAR(∆) = FA(∆)
NI
, (2)
FRR(∆) = FR(∆)
NC
. (3)
where FA and FR count the number of FA and FR accesses, respectively; and NI and NC are the
total number of impostor and client accesses, respectively.
To choose an “optimal threshold” ∆, it is necessary to define a threshold criterion. This has to
be done on a development set. Two commonly used criteria are the Weighted Error Rate (WER) and
Equal Error Rate (EER). WER is defined as:
WER(α, ∆) = αFAR(∆) + (1 − α) FRR(∆), (4)
where α ∈ [0, 1] balances between FAR and FRR. A special case of WER is EER, which assumes
that the costs of FA and FR are equal. It further assumes that the class prior distributions of client and
impostor accesses are equal. As a result α = 0.5. Let ∆∗α be the optimal threshold that minimises
WER on a development set. It can be calculated as follows:
∆
∗ = arg min
∆
WER(α, ∆). (5)
Note that the EER criterion can be calculated similarly by fixing α = 0.5.
Having chosen an optimal threshold using the WER threshold criterion discussed previously, the
final performance is measured using Half Total Error Rate (HTER). Note that the threshold is found
with respect to a given α. It is defined as:
HTER(∆∗α) =
FAR(∆∗α) + FRR(∆∗α)
2
. (6)
It is important to note that the FAR and FRR do not have the same resolution. Because there are more
simulated impostor accesses than the client accesses, FRR changes more drastically when falsely
rejecting a client access whereas FAR changes less drastically when falsely accepting an impostor
access. Hence, when comparing the performance using HTER(∆∗α) from two systems (at the same
∆∗α), the question of whether the HTER difference is significant or not has to take into account the
imbalanced numbers of client and impostor accesses. This issue was studied in [13], and as a result,
the HTER significance test was proposed. Finally, it is important to note that HTER in Eqn. (6) is
identical to EER (WER with α = 0) except that HTER is a performance measure (calculated on
an evaluation set whereas EER is a threshold criterion optimised on a development set. Because
of their usage in different context, EER should not be interpreted as a performance measure (in
place of HTER) to compare the performance of different systems. Such practice, to our opinion,
leads to an unrealistic comparison. The argument is that in an actual operating system, the threshold
has to be fixed a priori. To distinguish these two concepts, when discussing HTER calculated on
a development set using a threshold criterion also calculated on the same set, the HTER should be
called a posteriori HTER. When discussing HTER calculated on an evaluation set with a threshold
optimised on a development set, the HTER should be called a priori HTER.
The most commonly used performance visualising tool in the literature is the Decision Error
Trade-off (DET) curve [11] and Receiver’s Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve7. A DET curve
is a ROC curve plotted in normal probability co-ordinate scales in its X- and Y-axes. It has been
pointed out [12] that two DET curves resulting from two systems are not comparable because such
comparison does not take into account how the thresholds are selected. It was argued [12] that such
threshold should be chosen a priori as well, based on a given criterion. This is because when a
biometric system is operational, the threshold parameter has to be fixed a priori. As a result, the
Expected Performance Curve (EPC) [12] was proposed. This curve is constructed as follows: for
various values of α between 0 and 1, select the optimal threshold ∆ on a development (training)
set, apply it on the evaluation (test) set and compute the HTER on the evaluation set. This HTER is
then plotted with respect to α. The EPC curve can be interpreted similarly to the DET curve, i.e.,
the lower the curve, the better the generalisation performance. Although EPC is recommended, due
to the popularity of ROC and DET curves, it is reasonable to report experimental results with these
curves as well alongside with EPC. In this case, the pair of FAR and FRR values that constitute a
point in ROC can be derived from the FAR and FRR terms in Eqn. (6), i.e., with the threshold ∆∗α
derived from the development (training) set.
5 Conclusions
In this study, we presented a score-level fusion database, several fusion protocols in different scenar-
ios and some evaluation tools to encourage researchers to focus on the problem of biometric authen-
tication score-level fusion. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no work in the literature that
provides a benchmark database for score-level fusion. Hence, the efficiency of fusion classifiers can
now be compared on equal platforms. We also further encourage contribution of scores following the
same Lausanne Protocols to enrich this corpus. An extended version of this report, which includes
a greater level of details on the evaluation tools, can be found in [20]. Finally, some baseline results
on this data set using the fusion protocol with two experts (FP-2) can be found in [32].
7 A good introduction can be found in “http://www.anaesthetist.com/mnm/stats/roc/”.
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